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Abstract 
The relative advantages of private property and common property for the efficiency, 
equity, and sustainability of natural resource use patterns have long been debated in 
the legal and economics literatures. The debate has been clouded by a troika of 
confusions that relate to the difference between (1) common-property and open-access 
regimes, (2) common-pool resources and common-property regimes, and (3) a 
resource system and the flow of resource units. A property right is an enforceable 
authority to undertake particular actions in specific domains. The rights of access, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation can be separately assigned to 
different individuals as well as being viewed as a cumulative scale moving from the 
minimal right of access through possessing full ownership rights. Some attributes of 
common-pool resources are conducive to the use of communal proprietorship or 
ownership and others are conducive to individual rights to withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation. There are, however, no panaceas! No institutions generate 
better outcomes for the resource and for the users under all conditions. Many of the 
lessons learned from the operation of communal property regimes related to natural 
resource systems are theoretically relevant to understanding of a wide diversity of 
property regimes that are extensively used in modern societies. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of the relationship between private property and common property has 
engaged both legal and economic scholars in a long series of controversies over the 
meaning, the sequence of development, and the superiority of private vs. common 
property. The issues debated relate to the efficiency, equity and sustainability of 
private property as contrasted to common property. The scholarship in both 
professions has been characterized by formulations that are adopted by each 
generation of scholars without much effort to examine their foundations or to test 
them by empirical research. Both have their doctrinal aspects. And, the dominant 
view in both disciplines has been that private property is clearly superior to common 
property. Many scholars think of contemporary examples of common property as 
remnants of the past, likely to disappear during the twenty-first century (see Atran 
1993). Recent research, however, has challenged the presumption that private 
property is necessarily superior to common property. 
 
2. The legal debate over private vs. common property 
Prior to the publication in 1861 of Ancient Law by the distinguished English jurist, 
Henry Sumner Maine, the accepted view among Western jurists was that the origin of 
the concept of property in ancient times was the occupation of land by a single 
proprietor and his family (Grossi 1981). Further, the superiority of individual property 
holdings was so well accepted in the legal literature of the early nineteenth century 
that the possibility of other forms of property existing on the European continent 
threatened juridical views about the origins of social order. Maine drew not only on 
his own extensive research in India but also on the work of Georg Ludwig von 
Maurer (1854, 1856) on the primitive Germanic village communities, the Mark, and 
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of the pioneering work of William Blackstone (1766). Maine concluded that: ‘it is 
more than likely that joint ownership, and not separate ownership, is the really archaic 
institution, and that the forms of property that will afford us instruction will be those 
that are associated with the rights of families and of groups of kindred’ ([1861] 1963, 
p. 252). This set off a flurry of publications challenging and supporting his conclusion 
(see extensive bibliographic citations in Grossi 1981). The great debate had much 
more than academic importance, as major political struggles continued throughout the 
nineteenth century over the status of the many remaining forms of common property 
on the European continent. A legal and political belief system that saw the origin of 
property itself in the efforts of individual proprietors to occupy land gave the landed 
proprietor a special role in society. These beliefs helped to justify the passage of 
legislation to eliminate collective landholding rights and to authorize enclosures and 
the takeover of communal properties by individual proprietors. 
The meaning of private property in comparison to common property remains a 
contested issue in modern legal scholarship. Ellickson, Rose, and Ackerman (1995), 
for example, start their recent textbook on property law with a first chapter devoted to 
‘The Debate over Private Property’. The second chapter addresses ‘The Problem of 
the Commons’. In the latter chapter, they include parts of the famous article by Hardin 
(1968) on ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, but then ask students the following 
questions: ‘Private property is often said to avert the tragedy of the commons. But 
does it? Who enforces property limitations? Does another kind of “commons” 
problem lurk in the organization and maintenance of a property regime?’(Ellickson, 
Rose, and Ackerman 1995, p. 141). In an earlier volume, Rose (1994, p. 37) points to 
the ‘kicker’ in a sharp distinction between private and common property when she 
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stresses that a private-property regime as a system ‘has the same structure as a 
common property’ (see also Epstein 1979, 1994, 2002).  
 
3. The economic debate over private vs. common property 
Economists tend to view common-property institutions as having a longer history than 
private-property institutions and to explain the growth of modern, Western societies in 
part as the result of changing from common property to private property (North and 
Thomas 1976; North, Anderson, and Hill 1983). Private property is considered by 
most economists to be an essential ingredient in economic development due to the 
incentives associated with diverse kinds of property relationships (see, for example, 
Welch 1983). A farmer who owns his own labor, land and other factor inputs, for 
example, is likely to see a direct relationship between investments and the level of 
benefit achieved over the long term. A farmer who belongs to an agricultural 
production cooperative, on the other hand, may see only a loose connection between 
personal contributions and benefits. The more individuals in a society whose work is 
only loosely connected to their benefits, the more pervasive an attitude of free riding 
can become. If everyone tends to free ride on the work of others, overall economic 
productivity will be low. 
Private-property rights, however, cannot simply emerge spontaneously from a 
common-property system. Private-property rights depend upon the existence and 
enforcement of a set of rules that define who has a right to undertake which activities 
on their own initiative and how the returns from that activity will be allocated (V. 
Ostrom 2008). In other words, rules and rulers are required to establish, monitor and 
enforce a property system. While some rules generate incentives that greatly increase 
the welfare of most participants in an economy, there are always individuals who 
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resist changes because of benefits they receive from a prior system or propose 
changes that particularly benefit themselves. Rulers may also receive substantial 
returns from making rules that benefit some to the detriment of others. Thus, rent-
seeking behavior is expected on the part of both entrepreneurs and rulers. 
Common-property regimes are, therefore, presumed by many economists to be 
inefficient due to three problems. One is rent dissipation, because no one owns the 
products of a resource until they are captured, and everyone engages in an 
unproductive race to capture these products before others do (Knight 1924; Gordon 
1954; Scott 1955; Schaefer 1957; Cheung 1970; C. Clark 1976, 1980; Dasgupta and 
Heal 1979). The second is the high transaction and enforcement costs expected if 
communal owners were to try to devise rules to reduce the externalities of their 
mutual overuse (Demsetz 1967; Coase 1960). The third is low productivity, because 
no one has an incentive to work hard in order to increase their private returns (North 
1990). Common-property regimes are presumably retained by rulers who do not 
understand the enhancement in overall economic welfare that will result from a 
change to private property or who are supported by those who benefit from these 
‘archaic’ regimes. A common policy prescription is articulated by R. Smith (1981, p. 
467) when he stated that ‘the only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons in natural 
resources and wildlife is to end the common-property system by creating a system of 
private property rights’. 
 
4. Confusions that generate misunderstanding 
The debate about the relative merits of private and common property has been 
clouded by a troika of confusions that hinder scholarly communication. Different 
meanings are assigned to terms without clarifying how multiple aspects relate to one 
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another. The source of confusion relates to the differences between (1) common-
property and open-access regimes, (2) common-pool resources and common-property 
regimes, and (3) a resource system and the flow of resource units. All three sources of 
confusion reduce clarity in assigning meaning to terms and retard theoretical and 
empirical progress. 
 
The confusion between common-property and open-access regimes 
In a now classic article, Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) clearly demarked the 
difference between property regimes that are open access, where no one has the legal 
right to exclude anyone from using a resource, from common property, where the 
members of a clearly demarked group have a legal right to exclude nonmembers of 
that group from using a resource (see also Bromley 1991). Open-access regimes (res 
nullius)—including the classic cases of the open seas and the atmosphere—have long 
been considered in legal doctrine as involving no limits on who is authorized to use a 
resource. If anyone can use a resource, no one has an incentive to conserve their use 
or to invest in improvements. If such a resource generates highly valued products, 
then one can expect that the lack of rules regarding authorized use will lead to misuse 
and overconsumption. Some local grazing areas, inshore fisheries and forests are 
effectively open-access resources, but many fewer than presumed in the literature. 
Some open-access regimes lack effective rules defining property rights by 
default (Dales 1968). Either the resources affected by these open-access regimes are 
not contained within a nation-state or no entity has successfully laid claim to 
legitimate ownership. Other open-access regimes are the consequence of conscious 
public policies to guarantee the access of all citizens to the use of a resource within a 
political jurisdiction. The concept of jus publicum applies to their formal status, but 
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effectively these resources are open access. The state governments of Oregon and 
Washington intervened in the early twentieth century to prevent local salmon 
fishermen from devising rules that would have limited entry and established 
harvesting limits (Higgs 1996). Fishing unions along the US coastal areas tried to 
organize inshore fisheries so as to limit entry and establish harvesting limits during 
the 1950s. Even though their efforts could not have had a serious impact on prices due 
to the presence of an active international market for fish, the fishing unions were 
prosecuted by the US Department of Justice and found in violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act (Johnson and Libecap 1982). Thus, US inshore fisheries have 
effectively been open-access resources during much of the twentieth century as a 
result of governmental action to prevent local fishing groups from establishing forms 
of common-property regimes within those political jurisdictions. In more recent times, 
however, both the national and state governments have reversed their prior stands and 
have actively sought ways of creating forms of co-management in inshore fisheries 
(see Pinkerton 1989, 1994; Acheson 2003; Wilson, Yan, and Wilson 2007). 
A third type of open-access regime results from the ineffective exclusion of 
nonowners by the entity assigned formal rights of ownership. In many developing 
countries, the earlier confusion between open-access and common-property regimes 
paradoxically led to an increase in the number and extent of local resources that are 
effectively open access. Common-property regimes controlling access and harvesting 
from local streams, forests, grazing areas, and inshore fisheries had evolved over long 
periods of time in all parts of the world, but were rarely given formal status in the 
legal codes of newly independent countries (Wiersma 2005). 
As concern for the protection of natural resources mounted during the 1960s, 
many developing countries nationalized all land and water resources that had not yet 
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been recorded as private property. The institutional arrangements that local users had 
devised to limit entry and use lost their legal standing, but the national governments 
lacked monetary resources and personnel to monitor the use of these resources 
effectively. Thus, resources that had been under a de facto common-property regime 
enforced by local users were converted to a de jure government-property regime, but 
reverted to a de facto open-access regime. When resources that were previously 
controlled by local participants have been nationalized, state control has usually 
proved to be less effective and efficient than control by those directly affected, if not 
disastrous in its consequences (Curtis 1991; Hilton 1992; Panayotou and Ashton 
1992; Ascher 1995). The harmful effects of nationalizing forests that had earlier been 
governed by local user groups have been well documented for Thailand (Feeny 1988), 
Niger (Thomson 1977; Thomson, Feeny, and Oakerson 1992), Nepal (Arnold and 
Campbell 1986; Messerschmidt 1986), and India (Gadgil and Iyer 1989; Jodha 1990). 
Similar results have occurred in regard to inshore fisheries taken over by state or 
national agencies from local control by the inshore fishermen themselves (Cordell and 
McKean 1992; Cruz 1986; Dasgupta 1982; Higgs 1996; Pinkerton 1989). 
 
The confusion between a resource system and a property regime 
The problems resulting from confusing open-access regimes with common-property 
regimes are particularly difficult to overcome due to a second terminological problem. 
The term ‘common-property resource’ is frequently used to describe a type of 
economic good that is better referred to as a ‘common-pool resource’. All common-
pool resources share two attributes of importance for economic activities: (1) it is 
costly to exclude individuals from using the good either through physical barriers or 
legal instruments and (2) the benefits consumed by one individual subtract from the 
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benefits available to others (V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 1977b; E. Ostrom, Gardner, 
and Walker 1994). Recognizing a class of goods that shares these two attributes 
enables scholars to identify the core theoretical problems facing individuals whenever 
more than one individual or group utilizes such resources for an extended period of 
time. Using ‘property’ in the term used to refer to a type of good, reinforces the 
impression that goods sharing these attributes tend everywhere to share the same 
property regime. 
Common-pool resources share with public goods the difficulty of developing 
physical or institutional means of excluding beneficiaries. Unless means are devised 
to keep nonauthorized users from benefiting, the strong temptation to free ride on the 
efforts of others will lead to a suboptimal investment in improving the resource, 
monitoring use, and sanctioning rule-breaking behavior. Second, the products or 
resource units from common-pool resources share with private goods the attribute that 
one person’s consumption subtracts from the quantity available to others. Thus, 
common-pool resources are subject to problems of congestion, overuse and potential 
destruction unless harvesting or use limits are devised and enforced. In addition to 
sharing these two attributes, particular common-pool resources differ on many other 
attributes that affect their economic usefulness including their size, shape and 
productivity and the value, timing and regularity of the resource units produced.  
Common-pool resources may be owned by national, regional, or local 
governments; by communal groups; by private individuals or corporations; or used as 
open access resources by whomever can gain access. Each of the broad types of 
property regimes has different sets of advantages and disadvantages, but at times may 
rely upon similar operational rules regarding access and use of a resource (Feeny et al. 
1990). Examples exist of both successful and unsuccessful efforts to govern and 
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manage common-pool resources by governments, communal groups, cooperatives, 
voluntary associations, and private individuals or firms (Bromley et al. 1992; K. 
Singh 1994; K. Singh and Ballabh 1996). Thus, as discussed below, there is no 
automatic association of common-pool resources with common-property regimes—or, 
with any other particular type of property regime. Further, common-property 
arrangements are essentially share contracts (Lueck 1994; Eggertsson 1990, 1992, 
1993) and, as such, face similar problems of potential opportunistic behavior and 
moral hazard problems. 
 
The confusion between the resource and the flow of resource units 
Common-pool resources are composed of resource systems and a flow of resource 
units or benefits from these systems (Blomquist and Ostrom 1985). The resource 
system (or alternatively, the stock or the facility) is what generates a flow of resource 
units or benefits over time (Lueck 1995). Examples of typical common-pool resource 
systems include lakes, rivers, irrigation systems, groundwater basins, forests, fishery 
stocks and grazing areas. Common-pool resources may also be facilities that are 
constructed for joint use, such as mainframe computers and the Internet. The resource 
units or benefits from a common-pool resource include water, timber, medicinal 
plants, fish, fodder, central processing units, and connection time. Devising property 
regimes that effectively allow sustainable use of a common-pool resource requires 
rules that limit access to the resource system and other rules that limit the amount, 
timing, and technology used to withdraw diverse resource units from the resource 
system. 
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5. Property as bundles of rights 
A property right is an enforceable authority to undertake particular actions in a 
specific domain (Commons 1968). Property rights define actions that individuals can 
take in relation to other individuals regarding some ‘thing’. If one individual has a 
right, someone else has a commensurate duty to observe that right. Schlager and 
Ostrom (1992) identify five property rights that are most relevant for the use of 
common-pool resources, including access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and 
alienation. These are defined as:  
Access:  The right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy 
nonsubtractive benefits (for example, hike, canoe, sit in the 
sun). 
Withdrawal:  The right to obtain resource units or products of a resource 
system (for example, catch fish, divert water). 
Management:  The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the 
resource by making improvements. 
Exclusion:  The right to determine who will have access rights and 
withdrawal rights, and how those rights may be transferred. 
Alienation:  The right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights 
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
In much of the economics literature, private property is defined as equivalent 
to alienation. Property-rights systems that do not contain the right of alienation are 
considered to be ill-defined. Further, they are presumed to lead to inefficiency since 
property-rights holders cannot trade their interest in an improved resource system for 
other resources, nor can someone who has a more efficient use of a resource system 
purchase that system in whole or in part (Demsetz 1967). Consequently, it is assumed 
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that property-rights systems that include the right to alienation will be transferred to 
their highest valued use. Larson and Bromley (1990) challenge this commonly held 
view and show that much more information must be known about the specific values 
of a large number of parameters before judgments can be made concerning the 
efficiency of a particular type of property right.  
Instead of focusing on one right from the bundle, it is more useful to classify 
five types of property-rights holders as shown in Table 1. In this view, individuals or 
collectivities may hold well-defined property rights that include or do not include all 
five of the rights defined above. This approach separates the question of whether a 
particular right is well-defined from the question of the effect of having a particular 
set of rights. ‘Authorized entrants’ include most recreational users of national parks 
who purchase an operational right to enter and enjoy the natural beauty of the park, 
but do not have a right to harvest forest products. Those who have both entry and 
withdrawal use-right units are ‘authorized users’. The presence or absence of 
constraints upon the timing, technology used, purpose of use and quantity of resource 
units harvested are determined by operational rules devised by those holding the 
collective-choice rights (or authority) of management and exclusion.  
(Table 1 about here) 
The operational rights of entry and use may be finely divided into quite 
specific ‘tenure niches’ (Bruce 1995) that vary by season, by use, by technology, and 
by space. Tenure niches may overlap when one set of users owns the right to harvest 
fruits from trees, another set of users owns the right to the timber in these trees, and 
the trees may be located on land owned by still others (Bruce, Fortmann, and Nhira 
1993). Operational rules may allow authorized users to transfer access and withdrawal 
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rights either temporarily through a rental agreement, or permanently when these rights 
are assigned or sold to others. 
‘Claimants’ possess the operational rights of access and withdrawal plus a 
collective-choice right of managing a resource that includes decisions concerning the 
construction and maintenance of facilities and the authority to devise limits on 
withdrawal rights. The net fishers of Jambudwip, India, for example, annually 
regulate the positioning of nets so as to avoid interference, but do not have the right to 
determine who may fish along the coast (Raychaudhuri 1980). Fishing territories are a 
frequent form of property for indigenous, inshore fishers (Durrenberger and Palsson 
1987). Farmers on large-scale government irrigation systems frequently devise 
rotation schemes for allocating water on a branch canal (Benjamin et al. 1994; 
Shivakoti and Ostrom 2002). 
‘Proprietors’ hold the same rights as claimants with the addition of the right to 
determine who may access and harvest from a resource. Most of the property systems 
that are called ‘common-property’ regimes involve participants who are proprietors 
and have four of the above rights, but do not possess the right to sell their 
management and exclusion rights even though they most frequently have the right to 
bequeath it to members of their family and to earn income from the resource (see 
Berkes 1989; Bromley et al. 1992; McCay and Acheson 1987; McCarthy 2006). 
Empirical studies have found that some proprietors have sufficient rights to 
make decisions that promote long-term investment and harvesting from a resource. 
Place and Hazell (1993) conducted surveys in Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda to ascertain 
if indigenous land-rights systems were a constraint on agricultural productivity. They 
found that having the rights of a proprietor as contrasted to an owner in these settings 
did not affect investment decisions and productivity. Other studies conducted in 
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Africa (Migot-Adholla et al. 1991; Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994) also found little 
difference in productivity, investment levels, or access to credit. In densely settled 
regions, however, proprietorship over agricultural land may not be sufficient (Feder et 
al. 1988; Feder and Feeny 1991; Anderson and Lueck 1992). As land is densely 
settled, the absence of a title reduces the options for farmers to sell their land and reap 
a return on this asset. Further, without a title, farmers lack collateral to obtain credit to 
invest more intensively in the productive potential of their land (see Alston, Libecap, 
and Schneider 1996).  
Thus, a key finding from an overview of many studies is that no type of 
property-rights regime works equivalently in all types of settings (Quinn et al. 2007). 
For private-property systems in land to make a difference in productivity gains, one 
probably needs (1) a somewhat dense population so competition for use is present and 
(2) the existence of effective markets related to credit, inputs, and the sale of 
commodities (see further discussion in Section 7). In a series of studies of inshore 
fisheries, self-organized irrigation systems, forest user groups and groundwater 
institutions, proprietors tended to develop clear boundary rules to exclude 
noncontributors; established authority rules to allocate withdrawal rights; devised 
methods for monitoring conformance; and used graduated sanctions against those who 
do not conform to these rules (Blomquist 1992; Tang 1994; Lam 1998; T. Yandle 
2003; Weinstein 2000). 
‘Owners’ possess the right of alienation—the right to transfer a good in any 
way the owner wishes that does not harm the physical attributes or uses of other 
owners—in addition to the bundle of rights held by a proprietor. An individual, a 
private corporation, a government, or a communal group may possess full ownership 
rights to any kind of good including a common-pool resource (Montias 1976). The 
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rights of owners, however, are never absolute. Even private owners have 
responsibilities not to generate particular kinds of harms for others (Demsetz 1967). 
What should be obvious by now is that the world of property rights is far more 
complex than simply government, private and common property. These terms better 
reflect the status and organization of the holder of a particular right than the bundle of 
property rights held. All of the above rights can be held by single individuals or by 
collectivities. Some communal fishing systems grant their members all five of the 
above rights, including the right of alienation (Miller 1989). Members in these 
communal fishing systems have full ownership rights. Similarly, farmer-managed 
irrigation systems in Nepal, the Philippines and Spain have established transferable 
shares to the systems. Access, withdrawal, voting and maintenance responsibilities are 
allocated by the amount of shares owned (Maass and Anderson 1986; Martin 1986;  
Siy 1982). On the other hand, some proposals to ‘privatize’ inshore fisheries through 
the devise of an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ), allocate transferable use rights 
to authorized fishers but do not allocate rights related to the management of the 
fisheries, the determination of who is a participant, nor the transfer of management 
and exclusion rights. Thus, proposals to establish ITQ systems, which are frequently 
referred to as forms of ‘privatization’, do not involve full ownership. 
With new commons, such as the Internet, the bundle may include other types 
of rights. Hess and Ostrom (2007, pp. 52–53) found that electronic information 
resources often have more than five types of rights. Drawing on Schlager and Ostrom 
(1992), seven major types of property rights were identified. The following rights are 
defined for an online institutional repository.  
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Access  The right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy nonsubtractive 
benefits. 
 
Contribution The right to contribute to the content. 
 
Extraction The right to obtain resource units or products of a resource system. 
 
Removal The right to remove one’s artifacts from the resource. 
 
Management/ 
Participation 
The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource 
by making improvements. 
 
Exclusion The right to determine who will have access, contribution, 
extraction, and removal rights and how those rights may be 
transferred. 
 
Alienation The right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights. 
 
Other examples are the Creative Commons (CC) licenses that were established 
to allow authors to different rights for their works rather than the ‘one size fits all’ 
standard copyright agreement. CC defines the spectrum of possibilities between full 
copyright—all rights reserved—and the public domain—no rights reserved. Rights 
given to users by the authors are Attribution, Noncommercial, No derivative works 
and Share alike (see http://creativecommons.org/about/license/). 
The next two sections are devoted to a discussion of the attributes of common-
pool resources that are conducive to communal proprietorship or communal 
ownership as contrasted to individual ownership. Groups of individuals are 
considered to share communal property rights when they have formed an organization 
that exercises at least the collective-choice rights of management and exclusion in 
relationship to some defined resource system and the resource units produced by that 
system. Where communal groups are full owners, members of the group have the 
further right to sell their access, use, exclusion and management rights to others, 
subject in many systems to the approval of the other members of the group. Some 
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communal proprietorships are formally organized and recognized by legal authorities 
as having a corporate existence that entails the right to sue and be sued, the right to 
hold financial assets in a common bank account, and to make decisions that are 
binding on members. Other communal proprietorships are less formally organized and 
may exercise de facto property rights that may or may not be supported by legal 
authorities if challenged by nonmembers. Obviously, such groups hold less well-
defined bundles of property rights than those who are secure in their de jure rights 
even though the latter may not hold the complete set of property rights defined as full 
ownership. In other words, well-defined and secure property rights may not involve 
the right to alienation. 
 
6. Attributes of common-pool resources conducive to the use of communal 
proprietorship or ownership 
 
Even though all common-pool resources share the difficulty of devising methods to 
achieve exclusion and a sustainable level of harvesting of resource units, the 
variability of common-pool resources is immense in regard to other attributes that 
affect the incentives of resource users and the likelihood of achieving outcomes that 
approach optimality. Further, whether it is difficult or costly to develop physical or 
institutional means to exclude nonbeneficiaries depends on the availability and cost of 
technical and institutional solutions to the problem of exclusion and the relationship 
of the cost of these solutions to the expected benefits of achieving exclusion from a 
particular resource. 
Let us start initially with a discussion of land as a resource system. Where 
population density is extremely low, land is abundant, and land generates a rich 
diversity of plant and animal products without much husbandry, the expected costs of 
establishing and defending boundaries to a parcel of land of any size may be greater 
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than the expected benefits of enclosure (Demsetz 1967; Feeny 1993). Settlers moving 
into a new terrain characterized by high risk due to danger from others, from a harsh 
environment, or from lack of appropriate knowledge, may decide to develop one 
large, common parcel prior to any divisions into smaller parcels (Ellickson 1993). 
Once land becomes scarce, conflict over who has the rights to invest in improvements 
and reap the results of their efforts can lead individuals to want to enclose land 
through fencing or institutional means to protect their investments. There are tradeoffs 
in costs to be considered, however. The more land included within one enclosure, the 
lower the costs of defending all the boundaries, but the higher the costs of regulating 
the use of the enclosed parcel. 
The decision to enclose may be taken by the joint owners to divide the 
commons into a series of private plots owned exclusively by single families (Field 
1984, 1985, 1989; Ellickson 1993). The benefits of enclosing land depend on the scale 
of productive activity involved. For some agricultural activities, as discussed below, 
there may be considerable benefits associated with smaller parcels fully owned by a 
family enterprise. For other activities, the benefits may not be substantial. Moving all 
the way to private plots is an efficient move when the expected marginal returns from 
enclosing numerous plots exceed the expected marginal costs of defending a much 
more extended system of boundaries and the reduced transaction costs of making 
decisions about use patterns (Nugent and Sanchez 1989).  
In a classic study of the diversity of property-rights systems used for many 
centuries by Swiss peasants, Netting (1976, 1981) observed that the same individuals 
fully divided their agricultural land into separate family-owned parcels, but that 
grazing lands located on the Alpine hillsides were organized into communal property 
systems. In these mountain valleys, the same individuals used different property-
19 
 
rights systems side-by-side for multiple centuries. Each local community had 
considerable autonomy to change local rules, so there was no problem of someone 
else imposing an inefficient set of rules on them. Netting argued that attributes of the 
resource affected which property-rights systems were most likely for diverse 
purposes. Netting identified five attributes that he considered to be most conducive to 
the development of communal property rights:  
1.  low value of production per unit of area; 
2.  high variance in the availability of resource units on any one parcel; 
3.  low returns from intensification of investment; 
4. substantial economies of scale by utilizing a large area; and 
5.  substantial economies of scale in building infrastructures. 
Steep land where rainfall is scattered may not be suitable for most agricultural 
purposes, but can be excellent land for pasture and forests if aggregated into 
sufficiently large parcels. By developing communal property rights to large parcels of 
such land, those who are members of the community are able to share environmental 
risks due to the unpredictability of rain-induced growth of grasses within any smaller 
region. Further, herding and processing of milk products is subject to substantial 
economies of scale. If individual families develop means to share these reduced costs, 
all can save substantially (Agrawal 1999). Building the appropriate roads, retaining 
walls and processing facilities may also be done more economically if these efforts 
are shared. 
While the Swiss peasants were able to devote these harsh lands to productive 
activities, they had to invest time and effort in the development of rules that would 
reduce the incentives to overgraze and would ensure that investments in shared 
infrastructure were maintained over time. In many Swiss villages, rights to common 
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pasturage were distributed according to the number of cows that could be carried over 
the winter using hay supplies produced on the owners’ private parcels. In all cases, the 
village determined who had use rights, what the specific access and withdrawal rights 
were, how investment and maintenance costs were to be shared, and how the annual 
returns from common processing activities were to be shared. All of these systems 
included at least village proprietorship rights, but some Swiss villages developed full 
ownership rights by incorporating and authorizing the buying and selling of shares 
(usually with the approval of the village). Netting’s findings are strongly supported by 
studies of mountain villages in Japan, where thousands of rural villages have held 
communal property rights to extensive forests and grazing areas located in the steep 
mountainous regions located above their private agricultural plots (McKean 1982, 
1992a, 1992b). Similar systems have existed in Norway for centuries (Ørebech et al.  
2005; Sandberg 1998). 
The importance of sharing risk is stressed in other theoretical and empirical 
studies of communal proprietorships (Gupta 1986; Nugent and Sanchez 1993). 
Unpredictability and risk are increased in systems where resource units are mobile 
and where storage facilities, such as dams, do not exist (Schlager, Blomquist, and 
Tang 1994). Institutional facilities for sharing risk, such as formal insurance systems 
or institutionalized mechanisms for reciprocal obligations in times of plenty, also 
affect the kinds of property-rights systems that individuals can devise. When no 
physical or institutional mechanisms exist for sharing risk, communal property 
arrangements may enable individuals to adopt productive activities not feasible under 
individual property rights. In the Sudan, for instance, the variance in the productivity 
of land over space—due largely to the fluctuation in rainfall from year to year—is 
strongly associated with the size of communally held parcels allocated to grazing 
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(Nugent and Sanchez 1993). Ellickson (1993) compares the types of environmental 
and personal security risks faced by new settlers in New England, in Bermuda, and in 
Utah to explain the variance in the speed of converting jointly held land to 
individually held land in each of these settlements. 
A consistent finding across many studies of communal property-rights systems 
is that these systems do not exist in isolation and are usually used in conjunction with 
individual ownership. In most irrigation systems that are built and managed by the 
farmers themselves, for example, each farmer owns his or her own plot(s) while 
participating as a joint proprietor or owner in a communally organized irrigation 
system (Coward 1980; Sengupta 1991, 1993; Tang 1992; Vincent 1995; Wade 1992). 
Water is allocated to individual participants using a variety of individually tailored 
rules, but those irrigation systems that have survived for long periods of time tend to 
allocate water and responsibilities for joint costs using a similar metric—frequently 
the amount of land owned by a farmer (E. Ostrom 1990, 1992). In other words, 
benefits are roughly proportional to the costs of investing and maintaining the system 
itself. 
Further, formally recognized communal systems are usually nested into a 
series of governance units that complement the organizational skills and knowledge of 
those involved in making collective-choice decisions in smaller units (O. Johnson 
1972). Since the Middle Ages, most of the Alpine systems in both Switzerland and 
Italy have been nested in a series of self-governing communities that respectively 
governed villages, valleys, and federations of valleys (Merlo et al. 1989). In modern 
times, cantonal authorities in Switzerland have assumed an added responsibility to 
make periodic, careful monitoring visits to each alp on a rotating basis and to provide 
professional assessments and recommendations to local villages, thereby greatly 
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enhancing the quality of knowledge and information about the sustainability of these 
resources. 
Contrary to the expectation that communal property systems lacking the right 
to alienate ownership shares are markedly less efficient than property-rights systems 
involving full ownership, substantial evidence exists that many communal 
proprietorships effectively solve a wide diversity of local problems with relatively 
low transaction costs (Gaffney 1992; Hanna and Munasinghe 1995a, 1995b; Kaul 
1996; Sandberg 1998). Obtaining valid and reliable measures of outputs and costs for 
a large number of property-rights systems covering similar activities in matched 
environmental settings is extremely difficult. In regard to irrigation, a series of careful 
studies of the performance of communal proprietorship systems as contrasted to 
government-owned and managed systems, clearly demonstrates the higher 
productivity of the communal systems controlling for relevant variables (Tang 1992; 
Benjamin et al. 1994; Lam 1998). Schlager’s (1994) studies of inshore fisheries 
demonstrate that fishers who have clearly defined proprietorship are able to solve 
difficult assignment problems and assign the use of space and technology so as to 
increase both the efficiency and equity of their systems. James Wilson and 
colleagues’ studies also demonstrate that communal proprietorship systems are more 
efficient than frequently thought (Wilson et al. 1994; Wilson, Yan, and Wilson 2007). 
Performance of communal property-rights systems varies substantially, 
however, as do the performance of all property-rights systems. Some communal 
systems fail or limp along at the margin of effectiveness just as private firms fail or 
barely hang on to profitability over long periods of time. In addition to the 
environmental variables discussed above that are conducive in the first place to the 
use of communal proprietorship or ownership, the following variables related to the 
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attributes of participants are conducive to their selection of norms, rules, and property 
rights that enhance the performance of communal property-rights systems (E. Ostrom 
1993): 
1.  Accurate information about the condition of the resource and expected 
flow of benefits and costs is available at low cost to the participants 
(Blomquist 1992; Gilles and Jamtgaard 1981). 
2.  Participants share a common understanding about the potential benefits 
and risks associated with the continuance of the status quo as contrasted 
with changes in norms and rules that they could feasibly adopt (E. Ostrom 
1990; Sethi and Somanathan 1996). 
3.  Participants share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be 
used as initial social capital (Cordell and McKean 1992). 
4.  The group using the resource is relatively stable (Seabright 1993). 
5.  Participants plan to live and work in the same area for a long time (and in 
some cases, expect their offspring to live there as well) and, thus, do not 
heavily discount the future (Grima and Berkes 1989). 
6.  Participants use collective-choice rules that fall between the extremes of 
unanimity or control by a few (or even bare majority) and, thus, avoid high 
transaction or high deprivation costs (E. Ostrom 1990). 
7.  Participants can develop relatively accurate and low-cost monitoring and 
sanctioning arrangements (Berkes 1992). 
Many of these variables are, in turn, affected by the type of larger regime in 
which users are embedded. If the larger regime recognizes the legitimacy of 
communal systems, and is facilitative of local self-organization by providing accurate 
information about natural resource systems, providing arenas in which participants 
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can engage in discovery and conflict-resolution processes, and providing mechanisms 
to back up local monitoring and sanctioning efforts, the probability of participants 
adapting more effective rules over time is higher than in regimes that ignore resource 
problems or presume that all decisions about governance and management need to be 
made by central authorities. 
Two additional variables—the size of a group and its homogeneity—have 
been noted as conducive to the initial organization of communal resources and to their 
successful performance over time (Agrawal 2000; Libecap 1989a, 1989b). As more 
research has been conducted, however, it is obvious that much more theoretical and 
empirical work is needed since both variables appear to have complex effects (Poteete 
and Ostrom 2004, 2008). Changing the size of a group, for example, always involves 
changing some of the other variables likely to affect the performance of a system. 
Increasing the size of a group is likely to be associated with at least the following 
changes: (1) an increase in the transaction costs of reaching agreements; (2) a 
reduction of the burden borne by each participant for meeting joint costs such as 
guarding a system, and maintenance; and (3) an increase in the amount of assets held 
by the group that could be used in times of emergency. Libecap (1995) found that it 
was particularly hard to get agreements to oil unitization with groups greater than 
four. Blomquist (1992), on the other hand, documents processes conducted in the 
shadow of an equity court that involved up to 750 participants in agreeing to common 
rules to allocate rights to withdraw water from groundwater basins in Southern 
California. The processes took a relatively long period of time, but they have now also 
survived with little administrative costs for half a century (Blomquist, Schlager, and 
Heikkila 2004). Agrawal and Goyal (2001) have shown that communal forestry 
institutions in India that are moderate in size are more likely to reduce overharvesting 
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than are smaller groups because they tend to utilize a higher level of guarding than 
smaller groups. 
Group heterogeneity is also multifaceted in its basic causal processes and 
effects. Groups can differ along many dimensions including their assets, their 
information, their valuation of final products, their production technologies, their time 
horizons, their exposure to risk (for example, headenders versus tailenders on 
irrigation systems), as well as their cultural belief systems (Varughese and Ostrom 
2001). Libecap’s (1989b) research on inshore fisheries has shown that when fishers 
have distinctively different production technologies and skills, all potential rules for 
sharing withdrawal rights have substantial distributional consequences and are the 
source of conflict that may not easily be overcome. Libecap and Wiggins’s (1984) 
studies of the prorationing of crude oil production reveal an interesting relationship 
between the levels and type of information available to participants and the likelihood 
of agreement at various stages in a bargaining process. In the early stages of 
negotiation, all oil producers share a relatively equal level of ignorance about the 
relative claims that each might be able to make under private-property arrangements. 
This is the most likely time for oil unitization agreements to be reached successfully. 
If agreement is not reached early, each participant gains asymmetric information 
about their own claims as more and more investment is made in private information. 
Agreements are unlikely at this stage. If producers then aggressively pump from a 
common oil pool, all tend to be harmed by the overproduction and are willing late in 
the process to recognize their joint interests. Libecap’s (1995) study of marketing 
agreements among orange growers also shows a strong negative impact of 
heterogeneity. The theoretical work of Mancur Olson (1965) on privileged groups, on 
the other hand, predicts that when some participants have substantial assets and whose 
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interests are aligned with achieving an agreement, such groups are more likely to be 
organized. The empirical support for this proposition comes more from studies of 
global commons (Mitchell 1995; Oye and Maxwell 1995). 
Heterogeneity in the knowledge and acceptance of local common-property 
regimes is likely to lead to their undoing. In frontier regions, new migrants increase 
the number of people sharing the return from a common-pool resource. Further, 
migrants are unlikely to recognize the legitimacy of extant, de facto, property-rights 
systems (see Alston, Libecap, and Schneider 1996). Thus, the common agreement 
necessary for the sustenance of any property-rights system may rapidly disappear if 
settlement patterns undergo a rapid change. Similarly, common-property systems 
related to inshore fisheries have also proved to be unstable when trawlers from other 
locations start to visit on a regular basis without recognizing the de facto property 
rights of local fishers.  
 
7. Attributes of common-pool resources conducive to the use of individual rights 
to withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation 
 
The advantage of individual ownership of strictly private goods—where the cost of 
exclusion is relatively low and one person’s consumption is subtractive from what is 
available to others—is so well established that it does not merit attention here. 
Industrial and agricultural commodities clearly fit the definition of private goods. 
Individual rights to exclusion and to transferring control over these goods generate 
incentives that lead to higher levels of productivity than other forms of property 
arrangements.  
It has frequently been assumed that land also is clearly always a private good 
and therefore best allocated using market mechanisms based on individual ownership 
rights. Agricultural land in densely settled regions is usually best allocated by a 
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system of individual property rights. Gaining formal title to land, however, may or 
may not increase efficiency. Feder et al. (1988) conducted an important econometric 
study that showed that agricultural land in Thailand without a formal title was worth 
only one-half to two-thirds of land with a formal title. Further, increasing the security 
of private-property rights also led to an increased value of the crops produced 
(between one-tenth and one-fourth higher than those without secure title). More 
secure titling also provided better access to credit and led to greater investments in 
improved land productivity (see also Feder and Feeny 1991). Insecure property rights 
may lead potential users to arm and engage in violent conflict so as to gain control 
over land through force or by negotiation to avoid force. Several types of economic 
losses result from conflict over ownership (Umbeck 1981a, 1981b). 
Title insurance is another mechanism used to reduce the risk of successful 
challenges to ownership of land. Registering brands is still another technique used to 
increase the security of ownership over resource units in the form of cattle that may 
range freely over a large area until there is a communal effort to undertake a round-
up. Gaining formal titles is, however, costly. In societies that do not yet have high 
population densities and where customary rights are still commonly understood and 
accepted, formal titling may be an expensive method of increasing the security of a 
title that is not associated with a sufficiently higher return to be worth the economic 
investment (see Migot-Adholla et al. 1991). In addition, it should now be clear that 
the cost of fencing land by physical and/or institutional means is nontrivial and that 
there are types of land and land uses that may be more efficiently governed by groups 
of individuals rather than single individuals. 
A commonly recommended solution to problems associated with the 
governance and management of mobile resource units, such as water and fish, is their 
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‘privatization’ (Christy 1973; C. Clark 1980). Implementing operational and efficient 
individual withdrawal rights to mobile resources is far more difficult in practice than 
demonstrating the economic efficiency of hypothetical systems. Simply gaining valid 
and accurate measurements of ‘sustainable yield’ is a scientifically difficult task. In 
systems where resource units are stored naturally or by constructing facilities such as 
a dam, the availability of a defined quantity of the resource units can be ascertained 
with considerable accuracy, and buying, selling, and leasing rights to known 
quantities is relatively easy to effectuate in practice. Many mobile resource systems 
do not have natural or constructed storage facilities, and gaining accurate information 
about the stock and reproduction rates is very costly and involves considerable 
uncertainty (Allen and McGlade 1987; J. Wilson et al. 1991). Further, as Copes 
(1986) has clearly articulated, appropriators from such resources can engage in a wide 
diversity of evasive strategies that can destabilize the efforts of government agencies 
trying to manage these systems. Further, once such systems have allocated individual 
withdrawal rights, efforts to further regulate patterns of withdrawal may be very 
difficult and involve expensive buy-back schemes. Experience with these individual 
withdrawal-rights systems has varied greatly in practice (see McCay 1992; Wilson 
and Dickie 1995). 
Exactly which attributes of both physical and social systems are most 
important to the success of individual withdrawal rights from common-pool resources 
is not as well established as the attributes of common-pool resource systems 
conducive to group proprietorship or ownership. On the physical side, gaining 
accurate measurements of the key variables (quantity, space, technology) that are to 
be involved in management efforts is essential. Resource systems that are naturally 
well-bounded facilitate measurement as well as ease of observing appropriation 
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behavior. Storage also facilitates measurement. Where resource units move over vast 
terrain, the cost of measurement is higher than when they are contained (for example, 
it is easier to develop effective withdrawal-rights systems for lobsters than for 
whales). 
Considerable recent research has also stressed the importance of involving 
participants in the design and implementation of such property-rights systems. When 
participants do not look upon such rules as legitimate, effective, and fair, the capacity 
to invent evasive strategies is substantial (Seabright 1993). The size of the group 
involved and the heterogeneity of participants also affect the costs of maintaining 
withdrawal-rights systems (Edwards 1994). And, the very process of allocating 
quantitative and transferable rights to resource units may undo some of the common 
understandings and norms that allowed communal ownership systems to operate at 
lower day-to-day administrative costs. 
 
8. Communal property regimes in the twenty-first century 
The focus of this entry has been primarily on natural resources. Many of the lessons 
learned from the operation of communal property regimes in these sectors, however, 
are quite relevant for a wide diversity of similar property regimes that are currently in 
wide use and likely to have a substantial presence in the next century. A very large 
number of housing developments—both apartment houses and individual family 
dwellings—involve individual property to the housing unit itself combined with 
communal property to the grounds, recreational facilities, and other joint facilities. 
While individuals can buy and sell their individual housing units, at the time of 
purchase they assume a set of duties in respect to the closely related communal 
properties. Monthly assessments for the repair and maintenance of these common 
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facilities are not unlike the assessments made by a community of irrigators on 
themselves for the maintenance of their own system. Further, purchase and sales 
frequently require the permission of other members of the group. Similarly, many 
sports clubs allocate use quotas to members and assess members’ regular fees for the 
maintenance of the commonly owned facilities. 
The modern corporation is frequently thought of as the epitome of private 
property. While buying and selling shares of corporate stock is a clear example of the 
rights of alienation at work, relationships within a firm are far from being ‘individual’ 
ownership rights. Since the income that will be shared among stockholders, 
management, and employees is itself a common pool to be shared, all of the 
incentives leading to free riding (shirking) and overuse (padding the budget) are found 
within the structure of a modern corporation (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Putterman 
1995; Seabright 1993). Thus, where many individuals will work, live, and play in the 
next century will be governed and managed by mixed systems of communal and 
individual property rights. 
 
Notes on the bibliography 
The updated and revised bibliography1 adds well over 200 additional citations to the 
earlier version. We have selected articles and books that continue the tradition of 
common property scholarship as well as those that reflect new trends in this area of 
study. Noteworthy stronger foci are sustainability, the global commons, property 
regimes in transition, and the intersection of intellectual property rights and 
environmental goods. 
The crucial questions surrounding common-property management have 
continued to be ones of equity, efficiency and sustainability. Since the turn of this past 
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century, however, the issue of sustainability has increased in its importance and 
visibility in the commons literature (see, for instance, Agrawal 2001; Anderies et al. 
2007; Bressers  and Kuks 2004; Costanza et al. 2001; Kamara, Kirk, and Swallow 
2004; Marshall, Fritsch, and Dulhunty 2005; McMahon 2006; Meinzen-Dick and Di 
Gregorio 2004; Ørebech et al. 2005; Oses-Erasoa and Viladrich-Grau 2007; Pasqual 
and Souto 2003; Smajgl and Larson 2007; Veeman and Politylo 2003).  Ecological 
economist Robert Costanza (2000) writes:  
 
The most critical task facing humanity today is the creation of a shared vision 
of a sustainable and desirable society, one that can provide permanent 
prosperity within the biophysical constraints of the real world in a way that is 
fair and equitable to all of humanity, to other species, and to future 
generations.  
 
Some authors argue that developing new common-property regimes may be helpful in 
achieving sustainability (Buck 2002; Brunckhorst 2003; Buxton 2004; Marshall, 
Fritsch, and Dulhunty 2005; Williamson, Brunckhorst, and Kelly 2003).  
 New research demonstrates the urgent need for effective approaches to 
commons problems that are global in scale (E. Ostrom et al. 1999). Particular areas of 
focus on the global commons in this bibliography are biodiversity (Choudry 2005; 
Coban 2004; Goeschl and Igliori 2006; Tisdell 2004; Trommetter 2005) and water 
resources (Becker and Easter 1999; Dilworth 2007; Dinar 2000; Fisher 2004; Smets 
2004). 
 Common-property regimes in transition is a another noteworthy recurrent 
theme (see Banner 2002; Dekker 2003; Mwangi 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Majumdar 
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2007; J. Marshall 2001; John McCarthy 2000; Moyo 2005; Muñoz Piña, de Janvry, 
and Sadoulet 2003; Okello 2005; Rao et al. 2003; D. Thompson 2006). Mwangi 
(2007b), for instance, illustrates the complexity of regime change in her research on 
the transition from collective to individualized rights in Kenya’s Maasailand and the 
complications of politics and procedural problems. The ambiguity of certain property 
regimes leads a number of researchers to examine “who owns” various resources 
(Barnes 2001 [sky]; F. Brown 2003 [native culture]; Gepts 2004 [biodiversity]; Ho 
2001 [land]; Macinko and Bromley 2002 [fisheries]). Privatization is another kind of 
regime transition of great concern regardless of which kind of resource is involved 
(for representative works see Hannesson 2006; Hedlund 2001; Lesorogol 2003; 
Mansfield 2004; National Research Council 2001). 
Another growing area of study is the intersection of traditional property rights 
and intellectual property rights. Drahos and Mayne (2003) write that patents, as types 
of intellectual property rights, can reduce access to knowledge in such life-sustaining 
areas as genetics, health, and agriculture—a problem even worse in developing 
countries. Aoki calls one of these intersections ‘seed wars’—battles ‘over the 
ownership of intellectual property rights of germplasm—arguments over weeds, seeds 
and deeds’ (Aoki 2003; see also Borowiak 2004; Dutfield 2000; C. Thompson 2004). 
A number of works focus on rights to plant genetic resources and threats to 
indigenous knowledge and systems of agriculture (Barnett 2000; Dickenson 2004; 
Eyzaguirre et al. 2004; Kennedy 2006; Rifkin 2002; Spier 2001). 
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Notes 
 
1 The commons database in the library of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis contains 50,500 records of literature on the commons, common-pool 
resources, and common property. Of those, 779 have “common property” in the title. 
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Table 1 
Bundles of Rights Associated with Positions 
 Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized 
User 
Authorized 
Entrant 
Access X X X X X 
Withdrawal X X X X  
Management X X X X  
Exclusion X X    
Alienation X     
Source: E. Ostrom and Schlager (1996, p. 133). 
 
